For the group "Surcouf"
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Churidhar Cutting Tutorial
White Paper on Defence: a hope disappointed
For the group "Surcouf"
A group of senior officers and generals of the three armies of earth, air, sea, held in anonymity, said the White Paper on Defence and national security presented June 17 by President of the Republic. For the group "Surcouf"
elements of the new defense policy that have just been made public have been, which is normally presented by their authors in a very encouraging. The reality is somewhat different. Nobody can or wants, within the military, calling into question the political choices of the day. First, they are compelling in nature. Then the desire of the president, army chief, is to have a military instrument more effective at lower cost, think in terms of efficiency equipment and not prestige to be realistic about the threats, and finally not be deterred by any a priori dogmatic. This desire can not meet the approval of all those who have opted for a military career and who have suffered in recent years, the immobility of defense institutions. And we say, more than approval, desire, with desire and discipline to get that desire into reality.
The truth obliges us to say, however, that beyond the statements, the presidential determination has been widely misrepresented by those political, military or personalities qualified, had the burden of implementation. Here's why.
Even before the presidential election as the President of the Republic had seen, the French military system was out of breath.
In terms, first of all, real operational capacities: to question the choice dictated by lobbyists equipment programs, without specific regard for the needs arising from the reality of the commitments (this leads, by example and this year, a breakdown of the strategic airlift capability, which is at least unfortunate for an army very committed to the outside) because of the ban by the political authorities of the day to the staff of the armed forces to pursue a true "capability study, which had revealed that, as many times in our military history, a conception of the defense centered on "equipment programs" resulted in considerable public expenditure for operational utility low, with resulting in a "financial trouble" involving credibility even the Government's law enforcement program military.
Then, in terms of choice of commitments, the situation was not satisfactory. The absence of criteria politico-military intervention, the vagueness of geopolitical priorities (Africa), lack of management commitment in time (Kosovo) resulted in a scattering of forces dictated by the habits of the past and logic sheepish participation mandatory ("must be"). This resulted in a rate of sustained employment, undifferentiated, assigning units to equipment aging, degrading the level of operational readiness. And the other way, while taking terrorist threats increasingly widespread, the government and the army refused even to consider military action in the national territory, from a separate operational contract (with the notable exception of state action at sea).
Finally, in terms of organization, the situation was marked by much confusion. The choice of interventions were opaque, giving rise to any debate, including parliamentary, presidential outside the circle, which the phenomena of court and personal ambitions helping, was certainly not a quality factor analysis prior to the decision. The new definition of power Chief of Joint Staff did not cause any real reflection, based on subsidiarity, between logic and the logic of joint community, particularly for the support. Military organizations remained cumbersome, "doubles", focusing on operational shortly. Appointments to the most important positions were deliberate between military on the basis of uniform colors, as part of a barter almost permanent, resulting also in a period other responsibilities abusively short. The procedure for selecting equipment programs between the Directorate General for Armaments (DGA) and staffs, was characterized by opacity and conflict of interest (the "service industry") leading to drift opaque costs, uncontrolled, and inadequate equipment.
This means if the beginning of the quinquennium had raised the greatest hopes. Unfortunately it is likely they will be disappointed today. Firstly, instances of the decision have not worked satisfactorily, the mission budget of the general revision of public policies (RGPP) prevailed, including calendar terms, the mission of the conceptual White Paper. As to the latter, the underrepresentation of competent military has failed to do work of a realist, that its findings clearly show. The extent of structural conflicts finally own internal Department of Defense did not work serene.
Several positive points are noteworthy: the principle of closer settlements (which must await the implementation, the military is accustomed to the prevailing local political dynamics, which is the case for over twenty years). The emphasis on protecting "internal" to the nation itself, in terms of central organization and operational contract. The revaluation of intelligence functions.
Otherwise, the analytical model presented by the White Paper is in our view flawed and, further, marked by a certain amateurism. The white paper suffers from a quadruple inconsistency.
Inconsistency, first, against the general trend of attacks and responses generally adopted throughout the world. As crises multiply and overlap without resolve, Europe in general and France in particular reduce their defense effort at the moment where everyone is increasing (global military spending increased by 45% in ten years). We certainly can not deny the budget crisis. At least it should give rise to an analysis "prioritize" trade-offs between defense and other budgets, and within the defense budget. The White Paper did not provide the conceptual framework, since, under the threat it retains both the terrorist attack, the high-intensity war, disorder in the third world and pandemic influenza. Inconsistency
then compared to the evolution of the "conflictual" the paradigm of "industrial war" (between state arsenals) have been replaced by "war mongrel" most often "in populations." This requires both more numerous ground forces, a capability to project air and naval more assertive, a reorientation programs accordingly. These choices were made here by the British more than five years. We ourselves are the downsizing of the Army and the "postponement" of the decision to build the second aircraft carrier, signing a major rupture capability. Our inability to emerge from the "scaling reduction," for lack of a real analysis that the White Paper does not provide, led to the 2008 model only be the degraded version of the 1996 model, itself weakened version of the 1989 model. Suffice to say that no serious choice, outside the purely budgetary, a proportional reduction, has been done for twenty years. In this respect, the new orientation for the satellite or the creation of a "joint command of space" are contained gadgets, when we know the real needs and current forces. Not that such measures are themselves absurd. But they could argue that if they proceeded from a real analysis of doctrine and practice of "conflictual" based on examples many that this news, the Middle East to Central Asia. This analysis is absent from the white paper. The "advanced" that this (satellites, etc..) Resemble fads because they are not seriously argued in terms of the arbitration (when we see the industrial interests they serve). A reduction predictable and unimaginative format of armed, barely offset by hypothetical technological and organizational innovation: there is like a sham to present these results as an improvement in the effectiveness of the military instrument.
Inconsistency, third place, compared with the political will rightly by the Head of State. We come back into NATO, with a weakened military capability, and while claiming to command positions. We intend to make the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a major issue of strengthening European defense under the French presidency, and we drop our guard when we want to train our partners towards strengthening European defense. Most importantly, we abandon the British European military leadership, as we know the particular nature of their relations with the United States. France will play now in the division of Italy. It is unnecessary to pay any words.
Inconsistency in fourth place, compared with the only certainty we have: that we engage twenty times in Africa in the coming years, to prevent humanitarian disasters or to ensure the evacuation of our nationals. If we can do today is because our network gives us a base efficiency even more unique than all African countries refused the deployment of the U.S. African Command (U.S. command in Africa) on African soil. To win, and this is indicative of the method, 3 000 budget items, we weaken our position permanently, with the paradox that our lead will drop to a mechanical increase in the number of crises that we can not prevent and in which we can intervene at an incomparably higher cost. In return, the administrative structures intermediate staffs were not affected by exercise RGPP, while they represented a pool of savings of at least double. As for the "defense bases," it will not be for lack of appropriations for real infrastructure investment, as administrative districts for sharing some minor expenses (clothing, food, etc..), resulting in the creation of a simple administrative network further. The confrontation of these two elements to measure the character of sham measures presented these days.
The purpose of this article is not to present the model that thought wiser and more in line with the wishes of the Head of State, would have helped develop. We just want to emphasize that a large expenditure of intellectual energy has simply led to a scaling reduction of size of armies. At best, we will be better informed, but we less able to act. It would have required, instead, to better define the military ambitions of France and its geo-strategic priorities, including in concrete terms, designating the theaters useful; deduce a model for our army and its equipment, without refusing to wear the iron in the military or in that of the DGA; no illusions about the expected benefits of the "pooling of support," in an area where experience (especially British) teaches that it can only concern areas of second order, the "logic of the middle" continuing to govern the maintenance of major equipment. To having not done, the defense authorities have squandered the historic opportunity presented to them and the circumstances that justified the ambitions of the Head of State. The rest is a matter of political communication, which can not hide the reality of a real military downgrading of our country in a world far more dangerous than yesterday.
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