June 2008

Sunday, June 29, 2008

I Want To Tourist Place In Mysore

The "FBI's French," launched Tuesday

Source: AFP 29/06/2008

The French police is molting in laying the groundwork for a "FBI French" with the creation of the Directorate Central Intelligence Inside (DCRI), unified service, which debuts Tuesday. This new tool
marks the disappearance of the mythical DST (Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, spy-cons) and RG (General Information), and will be headed by the prefect Squarcini Bernard, a friend of President Nicolas Sarkozy, who welcomed the reorganization . The

RG, nicknamed "Big ears" of the government, a type of service in Europe, were subject to recurrent criticisms and accusations of being a "political police".
The DCRI is intended as a "French-FBI" intelligence that becomes a priority as in armies, according to police sources.
With 4,000 employees including 3,000 police called "active", the DCRI will deal with what was "the interest of the nation": terrorism, major protest movements, economic intelligence. That's what the police called in their jargon, the "secure", previously almost exclusively the purview of the DST.

Friday, June 20, 2008

What To Write On A Wedding Card To Your Sister

Simply bravo ...

The writer Jean-Christophe Rufin elected to the French Academy

PARIS (AFP) - The writer and diplomat Jean-Christophe Rufin, current ambassador in Dakar, was elected Thursday to the French Academy, the chair of the writer Henri Troyat, announced the institution.

Prix Goncourt in 2001 for "Brazil Red," Jean-Christophe Rufin has won the first ballot with 14 votes against 12 for the writer and producer of radio Olivier Germain-Thomas, two blank ballots and a ballot marked with a cross.

Born in June 1952 in Bourges, Jean-Christophe Rufin, a doctor specializing neurology and psychiatry, is a pioneer of humanitarian action.

He held important responsibilities to Action against Hunger (1983-1985) and Doctors Without Borders (1991), for twenty years and participated in various missions in Africa, Asia and South America.

Author in 1986 of a first essay, "The humanitarian trap", since he published a dozen books. His first novel, "The Abyssinian", won the Goncourt's first novel in 1997 and "lost causes" of Allied in 1999. "Brazil Red" is one of the best selling Goncourt last ten years.

Appointed Ambassador to Senegal In August 2007, Jean-Christophe Rufin was published in early 2008 an autobiography, "A leopard on the withers.

After his election, three seats remain to be filled at the French Academy, which has in principle 40 members: those of the writer Alain Robbe-Grillet, former Prime Minister Pierre Messmer and Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger. The election to the chair of Cardinal Lustiger was set for Oct. 30.

Wednesday, June 18, 2008

Churidhar Cutting Tutorial

White Paper on Defence: a hope disappointed

For the group "Surcouf"

A group of senior officers and generals of the three armies of earth, air, sea, held in anonymity, said the White Paper on Defence and national security presented June 17 by President of the Republic.

elements of the new defense policy that have just been made public have been, which is normally presented by their authors in a very encouraging. The reality is somewhat different. Nobody can or wants, within the military, calling into question the political choices of the day. First, they are compelling in nature. Then the desire of the president, army chief, is to have a military instrument more effective at lower cost, think in terms of efficiency equipment and not prestige to be realistic about the threats, and finally not be deterred by any a priori dogmatic. This desire can not meet the approval of all those who have opted for a military career and who have suffered in recent years, the immobility of defense institutions. And we say, more than approval, desire, with desire and discipline to get that desire into reality.

The truth obliges us to say, however, that beyond the statements, the presidential determination has been widely misrepresented by those political, military or personalities qualified, had the burden of implementation. Here's why.

Even before the presidential election as the President of the Republic had seen, the French military system was out of breath.

In terms, first of all, real operational capacities: to question the choice dictated by lobbyists equipment programs, without specific regard for the needs arising from the reality of the commitments (this leads, by example and this year, a breakdown of the strategic airlift capability, which is at least unfortunate for an army very committed to the outside) because of the ban by the political authorities of the day to the staff of the armed forces to pursue a true "capability study, which had revealed that, as many times in our military history, a conception of the defense centered on "equipment programs" resulted in considerable public expenditure for operational utility low, with resulting in a "financial trouble" involving credibility even the Government's law enforcement program military.

Then, in terms of choice of commitments, the situation was not satisfactory. The absence of criteria politico-military intervention, the vagueness of geopolitical priorities (Africa), lack of management commitment in time (Kosovo) resulted in a scattering of forces dictated by the habits of the past and logic sheepish participation mandatory ("must be"). This resulted in a rate of sustained employment, undifferentiated, assigning units to equipment aging, degrading the level of operational readiness. And the other way, while taking terrorist threats increasingly widespread, the government and the army refused even to consider military action in the national territory, from a separate operational contract (with the notable exception of state action at sea).

Finally, in terms of organization, the situation was marked by much confusion. The choice of interventions were opaque, giving rise to any debate, including parliamentary, presidential outside the circle, which the phenomena of court and personal ambitions helping, was certainly not a quality factor analysis prior to the decision. The new definition of power Chief of Joint Staff did not cause any real reflection, based on subsidiarity, between logic and the logic of joint community, particularly for the support. Military organizations remained cumbersome, "doubles", focusing on operational shortly. Appointments to the most important positions were deliberate between military on the basis of uniform colors, as part of a barter almost permanent, resulting also in a period other responsibilities abusively short. The procedure for selecting equipment programs between the Directorate General for Armaments (DGA) and staffs, was characterized by opacity and conflict of interest (the "service industry") leading to drift opaque costs, uncontrolled, and inadequate equipment.

This means if the beginning of the quinquennium had raised the greatest hopes. Unfortunately it is likely they will be disappointed today. Firstly, instances of the decision have not worked satisfactorily, the mission budget of the general revision of public policies (RGPP) prevailed, including calendar terms, the mission of the conceptual White Paper. As to the latter, the underrepresentation of competent military has failed to do work of a realist, that its findings clearly show. The extent of structural conflicts finally own internal Department of Defense did not work serene.

Several positive points are noteworthy: the principle of closer settlements (which must await the implementation, the military is accustomed to the prevailing local political dynamics, which is the case for over twenty years). The emphasis on protecting "internal" to the nation itself, in terms of central organization and operational contract. The revaluation of intelligence functions.

Otherwise, the analytical model presented by the White Paper is in our view flawed and, further, marked by a certain amateurism. The white paper suffers from a quadruple inconsistency.

Inconsistency, first, against the general trend of attacks and responses generally adopted throughout the world. As crises multiply and overlap without resolve, Europe in general and France in particular reduce their defense effort at the moment where everyone is increasing (global military spending increased by 45% in ten years). We certainly can not deny the budget crisis. At least it should give rise to an analysis "prioritize" trade-offs between defense and other budgets, and within the defense budget. The White Paper did not provide the conceptual framework, since, under the threat it retains both the terrorist attack, the high-intensity war, disorder in the third world and pandemic influenza. Inconsistency

then compared to the evolution of the "conflictual" the paradigm of "industrial war" (between state arsenals) have been replaced by "war mongrel" most often "in populations." This requires both more numerous ground forces, a capability to project air and naval more assertive, a reorientation programs accordingly. These choices were made here by the British more than five years. We ourselves are the downsizing of the Army and the "postponement" of the decision to build the second aircraft carrier, signing a major rupture capability. Our inability to emerge from the "scaling reduction," for lack of a real analysis that the White Paper does not provide, led to the 2008 model only be the degraded version of the 1996 model, itself weakened version of the 1989 model. Suffice to say that no serious choice, outside the purely budgetary, a proportional reduction, has been done for twenty years. In this respect, the new orientation for the satellite or the creation of a "joint command of space" are contained gadgets, when we know the real needs and current forces. Not that such measures are themselves absurd. But they could argue that if they proceeded from a real analysis of doctrine and practice of "conflictual" based on examples many that this news, the Middle East to Central Asia. This analysis is absent from the white paper. The "advanced" that this (satellites, etc..) Resemble fads because they are not seriously argued in terms of the arbitration (when we see the industrial interests they serve). A reduction predictable and unimaginative format of armed, barely offset by hypothetical technological and organizational innovation: there is like a sham to present these results as an improvement in the effectiveness of the military instrument.

Inconsistency, third place, compared with the political will rightly by the Head of State. We come back into NATO, with a weakened military capability, and while claiming to command positions. We intend to make the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a major issue of strengthening European defense under the French presidency, and we drop our guard when we want to train our partners towards strengthening European defense. Most importantly, we abandon the British European military leadership, as we know the particular nature of their relations with the United States. France will play now in the division of Italy. It is unnecessary to pay any words.

Inconsistency in fourth place, compared with the only certainty we have: that we engage twenty times in Africa in the coming years, to prevent humanitarian disasters or to ensure the evacuation of our nationals. If we can do today is because our network gives us a base efficiency even more unique than all African countries refused the deployment of the U.S. African Command (U.S. command in Africa) on African soil. To win, and this is indicative of the method, 3 000 budget items, we weaken our position permanently, with the paradox that our lead will drop to a mechanical increase in the number of crises that we can not prevent and in which we can intervene at an incomparably higher cost. In return, the administrative structures intermediate staffs were not affected by exercise RGPP, while they represented a pool of savings of at least double. As for the "defense bases," it will not be for lack of appropriations for real infrastructure investment, as administrative districts for sharing some minor expenses (clothing, food, etc..), resulting in the creation of a simple administrative network further. The confrontation of these two elements to measure the character of sham measures presented these days.

The purpose of this article is not to present the model that thought wiser and more in line with the wishes of the Head of State, would have helped develop. We just want to emphasize that a large expenditure of intellectual energy has simply led to a scaling reduction of size of armies. At best, we will be better informed, but we less able to act. It would have required, instead, to better define the military ambitions of France and its geo-strategic priorities, including in concrete terms, designating the theaters useful; deduce a model for our army and its equipment, without refusing to wear the iron in the military or in that of the DGA; no illusions about the expected benefits of the "pooling of support," in an area where experience (especially British) teaches that it can only concern areas of second order, the "logic of the middle" continuing to govern the maintenance of major equipment. To having not done, the defense authorities have squandered the historic opportunity presented to them and the circumstances that justified the ambitions of the Head of State. The rest is a matter of political communication, which can not hide the reality of a real military downgrading of our country in a world far more dangerous than yesterday.

36 Weeks Pregnant Having A Poo

The White Paper and the intelligence

In France, when you do not hear a question, it creates a commission that handles make it disappear. What connection with the information you say?

The White Paper launched yesterday on the track to the stars with great fanfare announced the creation of a post of Coordinator of Intelligence attached directly to the president and told the diplomat Bernard Bajolet, currently ambassador to Algiers. His role will be similar to the Director of Central Intelligence

the American intelligence community. But France is not the United States. Even if the different agencies do not collaborate with each other, starting with the CIA and the FBI, the fact remains that the United States, who copied it to British Joint Intelligence Committee. "For forty years since the Anglo-Saxon countries have a habit of working together, to share information internally between the various agencies that make up a community between ally and externally. It just has to see the latest blunder for MI-6, forgetting on a bench commuter a document stamped "For UK / US / Canadian and Australian eyes only" . France does not belong to these specific exchanges. Firstly because its services in the days of the Cold War, were not considered safe by the Anglo-Saxons. Secondly, because since that time Red Scare
they are considered only as second-class service, just good enough to tinker in Africa ... And yet, since the Americans took feet for twelve years, occupying seats that "Part of Human Rights " left free. In Algeria, but also in sub-Saharan Africa. The gasworks
sarkosyenne aims to achieve what the Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee (IRC) has never managed to do, coordinate all dependent services of the Ministries of Defense (DRM, Directorate of Military Intelligence; DGSE, General Directorate of External Security; DPSD, Directorate of Protection and Security of Defense), Interior (DCRI, Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence) and Budget (DNRED, National Intelligence and customs investigations, and TRACFIN Intelligence Processing and Action against Clandestine Financial Circuits). Although established by order of January 7, 1959, founding the whole of National Defence in France, grew its particularity each service, the military's failure to cooperate with the hunters of moles of the DST, both cultural inability to work together with civilians that because, without going back to the Dreyfus Affair, a cultural opposition equally between men and intelligence agents spying-cons. Two different jobs, two different approaches. And there is no question of tax collectors ... This mindset will not change with age-old desire policy. Returning to the United States, competition between CIA and FBI is Pregnant, despite efforts made since September 11 and another gas plant
the Department of Homeland Security . Basically, the most important in this position as coordinator of intelligence, which takes the place of the CIR, since it relies on the General Secretariat of National Defense (NWMO), is precisely that it is attached directly to President of the Republic. Until now, the heads of the French seeing only twice President of the Republic, at the time of their appointment, then they leave. Most High Authority of the State had no business intelligence. In part, this reflects the position of General de Gaulle in London, he had certainly shown interest in the intelligence function, but it was wartime. When peace returned, he would not be aware of current practices in SDECE (former DGSE), as was shown in his reactions to the case that Markovic at the Ben Barka affair. As Francois Mitterrand, the testimonies are numerous, from the testimony of his meeting with Pierre Marion until the order it did not sink the Rainbow Warrior ... To what extent is the coordinator change does something this established order ...

Tuesday, June 17, 2008

Throbbing Behind Left Shoulder Blade

is finally released ...

The White Paper is finally published French Defense ... two months after the originally scheduled release date. If we will not contest the fact that "the army, it ensures the security of the nation, not the land"

or reaffirmed the supremacy of intelligence, which will be discussed tomorrow, it goes without saying we wonder about the thinking that prevailed in its design. The six cases in which the Commission intends to use the means of National Defence:

1/Attaques major computer. These are considered presqu'inéluctables like in years to come, including from state actors.
2/Conflits may involve the Atlantic Alliance:
"An invasion triggering mechanism Alliance solidarity seems unlikely in the next 15 years. In contrast, in the context of an assertion of power or interests , or riparian countries to reach members of the Alliance may be tempted to test the limits of solidarity by adopting methods of indirect confrontation: regional destabilization point attack, threat of use of missiles, terrorist campaign ... What whomever committed, the risk of limited action leading to a calculation error involving the Strategic Alliance can not be overlooked. "
3 / Pandemics massive high case fatality " In the next 15 years, the emergence of a pandemic is likely. "
4 / natural or technological disaster of great magnitude: "The recurrence of major events and increasing severity was confirmed in recent years. The combination of a major technological accident with a natural disaster becomes more likely. "
5/Crises possible in a DOM. The main premises would be the Kourou space center. Furthermore, The committee identified a risk associated with migratory flows in Mayotte, French Guiana and Guadeloupe. 6 / Commitment to France in a major regional conflict:
"In such a scenario, the decision of France's commitment would result from a direct attack on strategic interests and would be designed from the outset in a multinational framework. This scenario is crucial to define the volume and capacity of action of armed (...). This scenario would not necessarily lead to a massive, unique, but could develop into a very diverse set of operations (the evacuation of the peace operation through the full range of special operations or targeted strikes) contributing to major action or covering. It may require security of maritime traffic in sensitive areas (Straits in particular) "
. Finally, the White Paper recommends that the clauses or agreements relating to the possibilities of intervention by France in view of policing within some countries, like Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon and Togo, are repealed.

Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc between 1989 and 1991, which attracted the attention of the drafters of the 1994 White Paper, relations international paradigm are clear shortcomings as revealed in the scenarios of 2007. It is clear that France lacks foresight, but this myopia affects all former supporters of Occidentalism. Historically, the period in which we live is not an aberration. The Westphalian system was swept away by the fury of 1914, bringing out the conditions (rise of totalitarianism) of the Second World War and the inconsistency of the international system that followed, known as the "Cold War".

Today, we sail on the feeling that it is replacing what has just disappeared so suddenly and with so little anticipation. Nor the Thousand Year Reich, the Communist empire has survived the twentieth century. But the current period has no other name that "post-Cold War, when U.S. does not adopt the name of" second cold war. As if the cycle of the two world wars had created a new one, based on the indirect action ... means for the West.

In this context, how to interpret September 11, 2001? Terrorism would have become the paradigm missing? To believe the president Sarkozy this morning, it would seem so. However, it is necessary to maintain, as we learn from our experience elsewhere in the Cold War, a capacity analysis objectively in order not to over-interpret the phenomena ...