A focus group revealed that the military solution is ineffective against most terrorist groups. To beat al-Qaida, he advocated a new strategy based on intelligence and police, and changing vocabulary.
An autopsy of terrorism to find the strategy for defeating al-Qaida. It is in this statistical exercise that were delivered Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki for RAND, the think-tank close to the U.S. Pentagon. In an attempt to understand the fate of terrorist groups, Researchers compiled data on 648 groups identified worldwide between 1968 and 2006.
They distinguished each group according to its staff, its goals, financial revenues, the political system of its territory placement, orientation (religious or political) and its goals. They then sifted through their fates. Of the 648 groups surveyed, 244 are still active, and 136 were fragmented or merged with other groups. Religious groups
toughest
And among those who actually discontinued the use of terrorism, the statistics speak for themselves. The "good news" is that only 27 groups (10%) stopped their activities after completing their goals, such as the Algerian FLN. 114 (43%) have laid down their weapons following a political agreement with the state. As for those who have actually been defeated, 107 (40%) were by means of policing and justice, being the main human intelligence, infiltrating cells, arrest of leaders and the development of anti-terrorism legislation . And only 20 groups were crushed on the battlefield by military means, or a percentage of 7%.
The report's purpose is to assess best practices for defeat al-Qaida and similar historical movements have been specially studied. Bad news: the faith-based groups are much more resistant than those with a political vocation. Since 1968, 62% of terrorist groups have ceased doing harm. Over the same period, the percentage drops to 32% if one counts only the religious groups.
The study excludes from the political solution to al-Qaeda, whose stated purpose is to overthrow the governments of North Africa, the Near and Middle East, the Muslim world to unite under one banner. The RAND Corporation estimates that the probability of success of al-Qaida is close to zero, but statistics show that chances of reaching a political agreement are even lower than the goals of a group are broad and ambitious.
As for the military solution to the current work, the study concludes that "there is no solution to terrorism on the battlefield." He added that brute force is often the "opposite effect" by fueling the hostility of the population, thus providing a reservoir of recruits for terrorists. The group noted an increase in actions of al-Qaida within broader and believes that the American strategy of "war against terror" has failed to weaken the terrorist. An army
present but unobtrusive
What strategy then? The study recommends a fight on two fronts. First, focus on solving policing against al-Qaida around the world, increasing the budgets of the CIA and FBI. Objective: To identify the key "nodes" of al-Qaida network, whether the decision points, communications and funding. It also means putting out of harm's way the heads of networks, with the rules imposed in a state of law. The report cites a member of the Coordination Unit of French counter-terrorism, which is part of a tactic cited as an example: to concentrate efforts on crime policies such as schedules of drug trafficking, easier to prove in court, to bring the suspects the "shadow" without waiting until they have committed an attack.
Then, the study does not advocate a total military withdrawal, especially for the special situation of Iraq, where al-Qaida is involved in an armed insurrection overall. History shows that military solution is more effective against large groups of insurgents terrorists (19%) as against terrorist groups in general (7%). In these areas, the military presence is "necessary" but The report stresses that it is not necessarily a U.S. presence. Local forces will have greater legitimacy and better understanding. It should therefore, according to this study that the United States confined their military role in Iraq to training or weapons.
The RAND Corporation suggests some ideological. For example, the group believes that the fatwas issued by the Council of Ulema in Afghanistan claiming that suicide bombers have neither virgin nor eternal life, were more effective than the tons of propaganda leaflets dropped by U.S. aircraft. Other symbolic change
but crucial: trade the "War on Terror" (war against terrorism), suggesting a purely military solution against the more traditional "counterterrorism" (terrorism). Similarly, it is no longer to get Bin Laden and others for warriors in a holy war but for common criminals.
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